On April 20th, Deepwater Horizon’s blind shear ram, the ship’s last line of defense, failed. The blind shear ram was not alone in its failures. By failing to equip the Deepwater Horizon with two blind shear rams, BP and Transocean are culpable. As is Minerals Management Service, the federal agency in charge of regulating offshore drilling, who failed by not requiring them to do so. These three entities are ultimately responsible for the immense scale and scope of this disaster.
A blind shear ram is part of a ship’s blowout preventer, a series of valves designed to seal off an oil pipeline in the event of a catastrophe. The blind shear ram consists of hydraulically powered blades, a sort-of extremely high-powered scissor, that cut through the pipeline, effectively sealing it up. While many offshore drilling ships are fitted with two blind shear rams, the Deepwater Horizon was only fitted with one.
At the time Transocean acquired the Deepwater Horizon in 2001, it was only equipped with one blind shear ram. This was at a time when Transocean equipped most of its ships with blowout preventers capable of holding two blind shear rams. Neither Transocean nor BP made the attempt to equip the Deepwater Horizon with a second blind shear ram, despite Transocean’s program line that 79% of its rigs operating in the gulf have two blind shear rams. All other BP rigs under contract are also outfitted with two blind shear rams.
Currently there is an argument between which company, Transocean or BP, was responsible for the decision to equip the Deepwater Horizon with only one blind shear ram. This controversy is one of the reasons why there are so many lawsuits against BP, as well as numerous lawsuits against Transocean ongoing today. If you choose to believe Transocean, BP was responsible for the decision; if you choose to believe BP, it was both companies’ call. Consulting with a Maritime Attorney is an individual’s best means of gathering real information as this situation develops.
Space limitations is the reason BP is now giving as to why there was only one blind shear ram aboard the Deepwater Horizon . But according to several experts interviewed The Times, a second blind shear ram could have been added by swapping some components out. A drilling engineer interviewed by the New York Times, referred to a blind shear ram as, “…kind of like a parachute — it’s nice to have a backup.”
While no backup was present on the Deepwater Horizon, what is even more confounding this that there was no federal mandate that required there to be. Not only that, but there are not even government regulations that requiring routine checks of important elements of blind shear rams. Given the fact that many studies are now being unearthed showing the many vulnerabilities of a blind shear ram, it borders on criminal that the Mineral Management Service did not enforce a rule requiring oil companies to supply proof that their blind shear rams even worked. Maybe a Maritime Attorney could provide better insight into Mineral Management Services role in all of this.
The fact that two enormous companies, BP & Transocean, refused to outfit the Deepwater Horizon with two blind shear rams, knowing the vulnerabilities of the unit, again shows why there are so many deserved lawsuits against BP and lawsuits against Transocean. Will the truth ever come out?
